TOWARDS A LEGAL RULES FUNCTIONAL MICRO-ONTOLOGY

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Abstract

A law is a documentary unit of legislation databases: the lack of an analytic, systematic approach hampers knowledge in management of legal orders. A legislative text may be seen as a vehicle that contains and transports rules and the legal order as an organism of rules rather than of laws, enabling us to observe its contents better. Rules are, therefore, seen as the true foundations of normative systems, whilst laws are merely temporal.

Method:
- adopting a entity of reference more analytical than the law (rule);
- viewing the legal order as a system of rules and the text as a set of rules;
- describing the nature and functions of rules (types);
- identifying significant and essential aspects of every type of rule (attributes);
- identifying privileged relations between types of rules (nuclei of rules).

The method operates through a computer-aided system for legislative drafting (Lavagna). Identifying the types of rules constitutes an indexing of the legal order, whilst identifying their attributes permits closer investigation of relevant contents. Knowledge about specific functions of the types of rules and their privileged relations within the nuclei permits diagnostic calculations regarding the consistency of normative systems.

Introduction

It is well-known how the lack of knowledge and control of the legal order, which depend on the scarce transparency of the legal system, represent a crucial problem for the legislator. It is my feeling that tools for the upkeep of legal systems must be designed, and introduced during the phase of drafting of the laws.

I therefore began to gather literature on the analytical philosophy of law and the different theories of the law, but also from linguistic theory, ideas and suggestions for singling out new perspectives adaptable to designing new informatics tools which could more efficiently serve the needs of the legislator in his work of formulating and managing legal norms (Biagioli 1991). The idea from which my research started out was the recognition that since the law is a normative and documentary unit of reference, it follows that the inability to obtain an analytical/systemic vision of a legal order will necessarily create obstacles to the knowledge and upkeep of that same legal order. It followed that what was required was that we individuate a more analytical unit of reference and take a more organic view of the legal system; thus from the very beginning, I began to explore the possibility of looking at the legal order and the laws as systems and sets of rules, gleaning from the theories of law and from legislative technique all possible inspiration for understanding and characterizing the rules.

In my opinion, the only road open to us is that of arriving step by step at individuation of a functional micro-ontology of law. More precisely, since our aim here is circumscribed to drafting of the laws and the upkeep of the legal order, it is my opinion that what we need is to succeed in defining a functional micro-ontology of law, if I may be permitted to call it that: an ontology of the legislative text.

Legal orders are often perceived as the sets of laws that accumulate within them through a dynamic process that expresses the "becoming" of the legal order itself. Legislative archives reflect this type of historical organization of the legal order, in which the documentary unit is thus the law.¹ The lack of a analytical/systemic vision of the whole poses an obstacle, as suggested above, to obtaining information about and exercising efficacious control over the contents. This seems in fact to be the key problem faced by the legislator, who in fact is hindered in his attempts to obtain knowledge of and to perform maintenance on the legal order.

The legislative text may be seen, I think, as a vehicle that contains and transports rules and the legal order as a set of rules rather than of laws; this approach allows us to see its contents more clearly. This perspective, inspired by analytic legal philosophy, permits us to perceive the rules as the true bricks in the legal system, and the laws as purely temporal events.²

It takes a model-based approach to the structure of the texts rather than to the legislative language, since it is there that the real problems faced by the legislator are rooted.

The method consists, essentially, in an analytic effort in which all the possible distinctions among the elements, understood as rules, that go to make up the legislative texts, are made, and singling out where possible the nature and the function of each. The question is that of taking note of the types of rules in use (without precluding the possibility of introducing new ones) and of defining their roles within a coherent functional vision of the legal system. More in detail, it includes:

1 - Adopting a more analytical reference unit than the law: the provision or the rule, meets this need perfectly.
2 - Viewing the legal order as a rule system and the text as a set of rules.

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¹ Or the partition (i.e. article). But the pith is the same, since the article is a fraction of a law, not an autonomous documentary unit.
² This is a very obvious simplification which does not take into account the organic function that the laws may perform, for example, by grouping homogeneous norms by subject.
3 - Clear definition of the nature of the rules. Determination of a principle for individuating the rules (explanations of their nature)
4 - Clear definition of the functions of the rules (characterization).
5 - As regards the internal structure of the rules, individuating the logically necessary attributes of each type.
6 - As regards the relationships among the rules, analyzing the recurring and privileged relationships among types of rules, and presumably individuating operative nuclei and/or subsystems of rules.

The first five of these assumptions alone would permit us to create informatics tools that could be useful both in the drafting phase and, and above all, for documentation or recognition of the legal system. From a purely documentary point of view, the first four, in particular, can result in efficacious indexing of the legal order through permitting identification of the rule types (Breuker & den Haan 1991). Assumption 5 provides a glimpse of the contents of the rules as such, and if taken together with the first four points, which are the suppositions for it, would permit conducting studies of the contents of the legal order - and this responds, in my opinion, to the legislator's most pressing need. Phase 6 would make it possible to carry out true diagnostic reasoning about the rules, activating knowledge of both the specific functions of the different types of rules and of their privileged relationships within nuclei or subsystems and thus permitting us to perform calculations concerning the coherency of the legal system.

My hope is that these abstractions (provisions, attributes, nuclei and subsystems of rules) will prove sufficient to capture those of the meanings contained in the laws which are most relevant to the processes involved in the drafting of legal texts and the control of legal systems.

I would now like to go on to consider some points I feel which might help to clear up certain aspects of the criteria used for individuation of the rules, their attributes and aggregates (if these exist), according to a method which I would call “systematic/functional”; while for the individuation of their functions, or in other words typing and characterization (point 4), I recommend consulting Rescigno's recent work on the subject (Rescigno 1996).

1 Rules and Provisions

The entire body of the law, the articles, may be seen as a set of provisions, intended as rules and carried by linguistic acts, and therefore propositions, whether simple or complex, endowed with meaning. Raz (1977)

The rules are temporarily seen as prescriptive propositions and propositions that "serve" them; that is, that are necessary for their comprehension.

But I ask myself whether or not it might be the case that all the linguistic acts (and therefore propositions) that we encounter in the bodies of legislative texts respond to that definition, and may therefore be understood as being rules as well. In truth, I am not alone in asking the question, but in the company of authoritative scholars such as Dworkin, who denies to certain components of law, such as those expressing the aims and the field of application, the logical nature of "rule". He feels that, rather, these components express the policies from which law arises and that they are external to the legal order, even though they are formally part of it. (Dworkin 1977)

What is the concrete basis for these observations? Besides being the first step in the analysis, they immediately imply practical consequences, in helping us to decide whether or not to exclude from such checkout operations elements that would seem not to possess the requisites for being subjected thereto. In other words, if such supposedly non-normative provisions are not taken as being rules of the legal system, they will not be considered in diagnostic investigations of the coherency of the legal system.

2 Regulative and Constitutive Rules

2.1 Linguistic Viewpoint

The regulative rules are similar to orders; they steer conduct in a direct and imperative manner and are normally followed by provisions providing for sanctions. The constitutive rules are stipulations, conventions, from which is inferable conduct which is indirectly steered by such rules; and they are normally associated with rules stipulating invalidation or redress with reference to deviant conduct.

This is a classical distinction, as illuminating as it is difficult to pin down. Studying it, especially in Hart as regards philosophical/legal aspects and with Searle helping out on the philosophical/linguistic side, I have yet to come to a clear and definitive understanding. From both authors I have understood that the regulative rules, or orders, operate in regard of the regulation of simple situations, while they are not sufficient for the modern legal orders, the complexity of which determines an ever-increasing need for ample descriptions and abstractions which it is impossible to formulate in the form of orders. There thus arises the need to make use of an abundance of constitutive rules. Searle distinguishes regulatory (or regulative) rules from constitutive rules: the first regulate a pre-existing activity, while the latter do not limit their action to regulation but also create and define new forms of conduct. Without these latter rules, which make it possible to formulate abstractions and innovations such as touché, checkmate, etc., certain activities would be inexpressible and uncontrollable. (Searle 1969)

Hart, as we know, distinguishes primary legal norms that impose duties from secondary norms that attribute powers. The latter always have a relationship with the former type, in the sense that while primary rules establish obligations, the secondary rules confer powers for creating obligations. To the second type, Hart attributes above all (but not only) the task of managing the evolution or change in the legal orders (legislative activity) and in their application; the evaluation, that is, of the correspondence of conduct with the legal orders themselves (judicial activity). But he also speaks of private powers, and here it seems to me that he is likening the notion of secondary rule the (more general) notion of constitutive rule. (Hart 1961)

These are two powerful intuitions that seem to me to have something in common but that are certainly not coincident. The notion of constitutive rule in Searle's

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3 Raz suggests among other things that a good criterion for individuation of the provisions should not depart too much or without well-founded reason from the ordinary concept of provision of law.

4 At least those directed toward society, while those targeting administration officials will be, I imagine, linked to other legal "remedies".
formulation underlines the innovative, creative aspect of the rules that cannot be traced back to orders. He adds that the constitutive rules are presented in systems, and that specularly, certain facts are comprehensible only if they are perceived as institutional facts. Typical institutional facts are those having relevance for the legal orders. He also associates the imperative form with the regulative rules, while the constitutive rules appear as analytical.

Hart's notion of secondary rule emphasizes the complexity and the evolutionary nature of the legal orders, pointing up the instrumental and not directly regulative aspects of the systems (change and decisions).

In the legal orders we find both regulative and constitutive rules. This dichotomy shows up well from the linguistic point of view, corresponding to an evident diversity in the linguistic acts that bring them into force. To the regulative rules correspond linguistic acts that operate as directives, while the constitutive rules make use of declarative linguistic acts.

It is not a simple question of style: the meaning of the rules of conduct will be understandable only if we perceive them as linguistic acts that provide directives, whatever the style of expression adopted by the lawmaker. And likewise for the constitutive rules, which would seem to be comprehensible only if perceived as declarative linguistic acts. These are the correspondences that emerge among elements of the legal systems and elements of the linguistic systems. (Sartor 1993)

It does not seem to me that Searle goes into detail about the constitutive rule systems, evaluating the need (or lack thereof) to use regulative rules, and therefore imperative linguistic acts, within it.

2.2 Normative Viewpoint

The considerations that emerge are different if we look at the question from the normative standpoint, which seems to me to consist in evaluating the legal relevance of the different rules, and whether or not they are also legal norms.

As it seems to me that Searle himself demonstrates, rules of conduct may be extracted even from constitutive rules: from these we may in fact infer orders, even though they do not make use of linguistic acts providing directives, but simply assuming the existence of a regulatory institution (legal system) and the adhesion to it.

But is it really true that rules of conduct can be inferred from all the constitutive rules, taken as a residual class and therefore not regulative? From the definition of a concept, for example? It would seem not.

For this reason Raz, for instance, takes as legal norms only those provisions that impose duties (corresponding to regulative rules) or that confer powers (corresponding to constitutive rules with juridical effects); all the others would be instrumental, and not normative, provisions.

I ask myself if the characterization of the constitutive rule originating in the normative viewpoint has available sufficient criteria for individuation. The linguistic criterion is no longer operative: the distinction between directive and declarative linguistic acts does not permit us to separate constitutive rules from instrumental rules. The criterion of normativeness, which permits us to distinguish, among the rules that are expressed by declarative linguistic acts, the constitutive rules from the non-constitutive rules, seems to me to be rife with uncertainty.

Raz presents them as provisions which confer powers, but, differently from Hart from whom he takes his inspiration, he would attempt for example to distinguish between rules which determine the capacity to exercise powers and rules which specify the forms it takes or delimit the duration and the very structure of the rights and duties created by the exercise of those powers. These latter rules would be, in his opinion, either parts of rules or provisions which are not legal norms but which have internal relationships with the legal norms.

Raz then expresses his disappointment that Hart lists, without differentiation, the legal norms that "determine the capacity to exercise powers", that "specify the forms and the procedures by which powers are exercised", etc., which Hart groups together under the heading "norms on which court activities are based". Raz would instead apply the distinguishing criterion of normativeness, which he would attribute only to those rules which constitute powers and not to those which define and regulate them. It therefore seems to me that Hart looks only at the general function performed by such a nucleus of legal norms without addressing the problem of how to individuate within it those (and only those) norms which would carry out a normative function. These rules would all, and indiscriminately, be legal norms (a little like Searle's constitutive rules, it seems to me), regardless of their greater or lesser vicinity to the types of conduct called up.

I would seem to understand that the quality of normativeness would thus lie in the fact that they regulate all together and in an organic manner, as homogeneous nuclei, rather than in their power to recall orders. They describe the game played in court, Searle would say, instead of preparing precise orders; the regulation lies in their overall description; the orders are inferable, but require, it would seem to me, a further interpretative effort.

It seems to me that the normative point of view introduces an additional notion, that of the legal norm that is not coincident with the notion of rule. Not all rules have legal relevance, not all are determinant as regards conduct, not all are norms.

2.3 Functional Viewpoint

I find that Searle's notion of constitutive rules and Hart's of secondary rules have in common the fact that they both refer to rules which create abstract instrumental entities which are indispensable to the legal orders and from which rules of conduct may be inferred.

Moreover, the notion of secondary rules also embraces analysis of that complexity which is typical of the rule-based legal systems, through the enucleation of sectors of the legal order with specific general functions different from the generic determination of citizens' conduct. The systematic nature of the legal orders makes it necessary to have constitutive rules, as Searle asserts, and their complexity and permanence over time require us to have secondary rules, as Hart asserts, that regulate, above all, change in the legal orders and the determination and judgement of violations of it.

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4 H.L.A. Hart, p. 36 (ital. ver.).
5 This is, in fact, the restrictive sense of "constitutive" used by the normative approach to individuation of rules.
I would like to henceforth take "constitutive rules" to mean rules that introduce into the legal order entities from which are inferable conduct, ignoring the problem raised by Raz (among others) of the greater or lesser normative relevance of each; that is, as Searle and Hart intend the term, if I am not mistaken.

For "functional" viewpoint I mean the stance, as I understand it, from which Hart (as well as Raz) observes the legal order, as an organism made up of rules. An organism which may be structured on the basis of conceptually independent parts, as this point of view would seem to suggest to me, but nevertheless made up of rules each with individual and interactive functions.

I ask myself if this point of view can supply us with a different criterion for individuating rules.

All the rules making up the legal order interact and collaborate in the determination of conduct. The supporters of the normative point of view thus often understand all the rules that cannot be characterized as being regulative or normative (the majority) as being instrumental rules or rules on rules.

Among these are also included the rules of change, which are divisible into two families, cross-references and amendments, and which act on the legal system in such a manner as to ensure the connections and the adjustments made necessary by the introduction of new laws. They act on specific rules in the legal order in such a way as to eliminate them, to change them, or to link them up with other rules.

I hope is acceptable the following distinction: there are "rules on rules" (amendments and cross-references) that operate, with the most disparate ends, but all traceable to the construction and maintenance of the legal system, on well-defined rules of the legal system and there are also so called "rules on rules" (constitutive) that instead operate in an indirect, constant and universal manner (according to the function that characterizes each type) on all the rules linked to them by nexuses of meaning.

The technical provisions (amendments and cross-references) have as their objects rules; the constitutive provisions have objects (concern objects) which are not rules. These objects are used by other rules.

The technical provisions for change do not regulate fragments of reality, even in an abstract manner. They instead regulate the regulation of reality (system of change\textsuperscript{8}) in both constitutive and regulative, or direct, manners. They are the regulative rules of the system of management of the legal system and have their respective constitutive rules, those which regulate intervention on the legal system (repeal, etc.) in an abstract, constitutive manner.

3 Toward an organic view of the rule system: generalization of the functional point of view

This was just an example of individuating rules according to the systematic/functional prospect. It is my hope that it will be possible to isolate, within the legal system, areas that are relatively independent and singly interesting, that are formed of rules of both regulative and constitutive natures endowed with specific and tightly-interconnected functions applicable to the regulation of that area or, that is, to a functional portion of the legal system.

I take "areas" to mean nuclei and subsystems of rules. If the area is autonomous, if it does not have any functional relationships with other parts of the legal order, it may be considered a sub-system. If, instead, the set interacts with other rules external to it, even though the relationships within the set may be more significant, it may be taken to be an operative nucleus.

An example of what I intend for nucleus is given by Raz, when he characterizes the entity "rights" through individuation of the rules devoted to it, which he types as "institutive", "constitutive", "acquisitive", and "privative.\textsuperscript{9} Obviously, from his "normative" point of view, they are taken as being non-normative provisions, in the sense that they do not immediately produce rules of conduct but rather only powers (only the constitutive rules). This is irrelevant here. What I am anxious to point up is the characterization efficacy of this small group of rules, the nucleus, for representing an entity, such as rights, of relevance to the legal order.

And not only "representing": such a configuration, if extended to the legal order as a whole, would permit performing diagnostic controls on the internal consistency of similar aggregates and on their relations with other components (external consistency), both during the drafting phase and in the data base investigation of existing legislation.

Another example is that discussed above, of the sub-system of rules for change. The relative rules would seem to me to be already well-characterized in practice\textsuperscript{10}: each has a clearly recognizable function that is compatible with those of the others, and all together (regulative and constitutive rules) they are capable of performing the generalized function of maintenance or dynamic management of the legal system.

4 Rule Attributes

The method presented here associates with each rule not only given functions, but also certain given attributes (point 5 of the introductory outline) that identify aspects which are logically necessary to the provisions and without which the provisions would be incomplete: for example, attributes that at first glance are essential to an institutive rule are the institutive entity and the body; to a definition the definiendum, and so on.

The practical intent, let me reiterate, is to individuate the significant, or better logically necessary, aspects of the different provisions on order to be able to use them both as tools aiding drafting (planning of the formulation of the provisions, through use of standard outlines) and, and above all, as aids to legislative documentation (research based on the analytic, meaningful and certain contents of the norms); as well as in diagnosis (evaluation of the relationships among the essential contents of the provisions).

I am not aware of any rigorous method for individuation of the attributes. It seems to me that intuition is sufficient if it is supported by double checks, which will consist in evaluation of the indispensability of the candidate attributes to expression of the general meaning of the rules that contain them. If without them the rule seems to be unable to perform that which we feel it to be its role, the individuation may be taken as being good. (Ainis 1966)

5 Conclusions

\textsuperscript{8} Those of Hart's secondary rules which have to do with bringing about change in the legal order.

\textsuperscript{9} J. Raz, p. 238 (it. ver.).

\textsuperscript{10} At least as regards italian legislation.
The following notions and distinctions emerged from the previous linguistic, normative and ontological considerations:

1. Composed of rules and provisions. The latter are understood as being rules that are not regulative but rather subsidiary (information).
2. The two-faced rules are regulative as regards the types of behavior that are imperatively disciplined and sanctioned; they are constitutive for the others, which describe the stipulated world.
3. The normative importance, that status of norm achieved by certain rules, will emerge in the text by association of the status with certain functional types, if this is possible; an extra-textual interpretation will otherwise be required.
4. The legal order is seen as an organized system of rules within which the rules themselves interact; the functions of the various rules and aggregates are thus substantially interdependent.
5. Each rule performs its own tasks according to the needs and the customs of the lawmakers as well as to those necessities which are intrinsic to the legal order. This aspect must always and in any case be understood as being a level of expression, and therefore flexible, in the sense that the lawmaker is always free to add, or remove, those types of rules which he may feel are necessary, or useless, to his expressive needs.
6. The constant function of each of the rules is manifested in those of its elements which are necessary and constitutive and as such characteristic and always present: those which we have here called, perhaps somewhat improperly, attributes. They are, in truth, the constitutive elements of that type of rule.
7. It is convenient to group rules into composite units in order to express complex regulative components in a more efficacious and rigorous manner.

The systematic/functional method described here can work as a direct technical information-based legislative tool (Lavagna) in the phase of formulation of the legislative text, while the advantages that it will offer at the documentary and diagnostic levels are successive and derived effects, and therefore implicit.

Moreover the effects of a similar process of rationalization would naturally extend to all the processes that make use of legal norms.

References

Appendices

Lavagna
The legal drafting system Lavagna, based on this method, or rather which activates the method, is now in the experimental phase. At the moment, what we have available is a pilot version simulating general aspects of text building in accordance with the functional method. It makes use of knowledge of the method described here and of legislative technique in general:
- The text may contain one or more objects, or "legal themes".
- The text is composed of rules.
- The rules are of different types, according to the various choices and the formulations made by the lawmaker (open lists).
- The system has available to it general technical and legislative knowledge concerning the organization of the text with reference to the rule types.
- As regards types, the system contains knowledge of a specific, systematic nature (attributes), technical/legislative knowledge and juridical knowledge, which it makes available during the drafting phase.
- It has available to it general knowledge regarding the organization of legal tests into parts (partitions).
- Any of the knowledge contained in the system may be disregarded or dynamically changed within the framework of given standards.

Procedure for Individuation of a Legal Rules Functional Micro-Ontology

Theoretical Premises
1 - Adopting a more analytical reference unit than the law: the provision or the rule, meets this need perfectly.
2 - Viewing the legal order as a rule system and the text as a set of rules.
3 - Clear definition of the nature of the rules. Determination of a principle for individuating the rules (explanations of their nature)
4 - Clear definition of the functions of the rules (characterization).
5 - As regards the internal structure of the rules, individuating the logically necessary attributes of each type.
6 - As regards the relationships among the rules, analyzing the recurring and privileged relationships among types of rules, and presumably individuating operative nuclei and/or subsystems of rules.

Study of Individuation Criteria

- Distinctions among provisions on the basis of their logical affinity or non-affinity with the legal order (R.M. Dworkin);
- among rules, on the basis of their general or linguistic nature (regulative-constitutive) (J.R. Searle);
- among rules, on the basis of their importance in law (rules and legal norms) (J. Raz, G.U. Rescigno);
- among rules, on the basis of their functions (see the characterizations given them by Rescigno);
- among nuclei of rules within subsystems (J. Raz);
- among functionally-independent subsystems (H.L.A. Hart).

Resultant Elements
1 - Provisions and rules
2 - Regulative and constitutive rules (imperative and analytical forms)
3 - Rules and legal norms
4 - The legal order as an organic rule system
5 - The functions of the rules
6 - The attributes of the rules
7 - Functional aggregates of rules.

A Vision of the Legal Order
1. Composed of rules and provisions. The latter are understood as being rules that are not regulative but rather subsidiary (information).
2. The two-faced rules are regulative as regards the types of behavior that are imperatively disciplined and sanctioned; they are constitutive for the others, which describe the stipulated world.
3. The normative importance, that status of norm achieved by certain rules, will emerge in the text by association of the status with certain functional types, if this is possible; an extra-textual interpretation will otherwise be required.
4. The legal order is seen as an organized system of rules within which the rules themselves interact; the functions of the various rules and aggregates are thus substantially interdependent.
5. Each rule performs its own tasks according to the needs and the customs of the lawmakers as well as to those necessities which are intrinsic to the legal order. This aspect must always and in any case be understood as being a level of expression, and therefore flexible, in the sense that the lawmaker is always free to add, or remove, those types of rules which he may feel are necessary, or useless, to his expressive needs.
6. The constant function of each of the rules is manifested in those of its elements which are necessary and constitutive and as such characteristic and always present: those which we have here called, perhaps somewhat improperly, attributes. They are, in truth, the constitutive elements of that type of rule.
7. It is convenient to group rules into composite units in order to express complex regulative components in a more efficacious and rigorous manner.

Statutory Texts Functional Structure

The components of the Statutory Texts:
- heading
  - name of the law
  - date of issuance
  - serial number
  - title of the law
- promulgation formula
- preamble
The components of the Statutory Body:
provisions:
- aims
- field of application
- general principles
rules: (open list)

The components of the Rules: (attributes)
- basic components
- title

Provisions and Rules Structured List

Behavioural Rules Subsystem:
Constitutive Rules: ("What is it?")
institutive
- activities
- organizations
competences
- juridical person
- status
- rights
  - acquisitive
  - privative
  - constitutive
powers

invalidations

instrumental: ("How are we to do it?")
- notions
- definitions
- standards:
  - classifications
- procedures:
  - procedural
- means:
  - organizing
financials

Regulative Rules: ("What are we to do?")
- behaviour
- sanctions

Changes in the Legislative System:

costitutive rules on rules:

regulative rules on rules:
- field of application
derogation
extension
text
  - abrogation
  - integration
  - amendment
time
  - prorogation
  - suspension
  - temporary

validity
- retroactivity
ultractivity
revival
in force
reference
implementing

Judgement Rules:
constitutive:
- rules on interpretation

regulative:
- original interpretation

Informative provisions:
- field of application
- aims
- general principles

Provisions, Rules and Attributes List

institutive
- activities
- organizing
constitutive powers
- subject, object...
acquisitive
- subject, object, conditions...
privative
- subject, object, conditions...

assignment of competences
- subject, object...
invalidating
- modality, object...
definitions
- definiendum...
classifications
- object...
procedurals
- subject, activity...
financial
- amount, organ...
behaviour
- subject, action, modality...
sanctions
- subject,broken rule, sanction type...

rules ruling rules
- object...
derogation
extension
abrogation
integration
modification
prorogation
suspension
temporary
retroactivity
ultractivity
revival
in force
reference
implementing
coordinating

rules interpreting rules
- object...
provisions:
- field of application
- aims
- general principles

\[\text{footnote}{A partial example. The underlined elements are guidelines; the italic ones are operative. The user can add, eliminate and move elements from both sets.}\]